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PATHOS AND THE "APPEAL TO EMOTION": AN ARISTOTELIAN ANALYSIS

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I

DESPITE the development in recent years of an extensive philosophical literature on the emotions, with great emphasis on their cognitive aspects, little attention has been given to the question of the legitimacy of the "appeal to emotion" as a form or aspect of argument.[1] What little logic textbooks have to say about the emotions is for the most part to be found in treatments of so-called "informal fallacies" such as the *ad misericordiam*, *ad populum*, and *ad baculum*.[2] I propose here to offer a sketch of an account of the role of the emotions in rational persuasion; my concern is with what seems to be their legitimate role in argument rather than with logical abuses. The recent philosophical literature has a great deal to offer to the details of a full account. My approach will be, however, to make only passing references to recent literature, and to ground my sketch mainly in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Rhetoric*.[3] The reason for this approach is two-fold: first, the most relevant and central insights for our topic are to be found already in Aristotle; and, second, Aristotle writes not only as a philosopher but also as a rhetorical theorist, which gives him a better appreciation than most contemporary philosophers have of the importance of the emotions in the actual conduct of argumentation.[4]

II

In the first chapter of Bk.I of the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle complains that current rhetorical treatises place too much emphasis on influencing the emotions of hearers ("judges"). "The arousing of prejudice, pity, anger, and similar *pathe* has nothing to do with the essential facts, but is merely a personal appeal to the man who is judging the case . . . . It is not right to pervert the judge by moving him to anger or envy or pity—one might as well warp a carpenter's rule before using it" (1354a). Such appeals, he says, are mere "accessories" and not an essential part of rhetorical proof. In the very next chapter, however, he puts *pathos* on the same footing with *logos* and *ethos* as means of persuasion or rhetorical proof, and there it remains for the rest of the work. As to whether there is any real conflict between Aristotle's initial remarks about *pathos* and its role in the rest of

the *Rhetoric* we need not for the moment concern ourselves. The point is that Aristotle does have reservations about the influence of the emotions on judgment, which he expresses in what are now stock terms: the emotions interfere with and distort reasoning. This is reinforced by comments made at several points in *EN* (e.g., at 1095a).

III

But, again, *pathos* is taken seriously as a means of persuasion in the remainder of the *Rhetoric*. A substantial portion of Bk.II is devoted to *pathos*, with separate chapters on *anger, friendliness, fear, shame, kindliness, pity, indignation, envy, emulation*, and (where appropriate) their opposites. The "definitions" of specific emotions are perhaps best regarded as stipulations of ranges of feeling which have rhetorical importance. But the conceptions are meant to be taken seriously, though each is delimited in a way suited to rhetorical concerns.[5]

Generally by *pathe* Aristotle means (in the *Rhetoric* at least) *feelings which influence human judgment or decision-making and which are accompanied by pleasure or pain* (1378a). Here and in the case of each emotion, not much is said about the nature of the feeling itself. There is also no real attention to *how* various *pathe* affect judgment. That they do and the ways in which they do are, perhaps, like the nature of the feeling itself, taken to be well known. (On this matter, see Leighton (1982), Section I.)

Aristotle's treatment of each particular emotion is given under three headings (1378a): (1) the *state of mind* of the person to be affected, (2) the *persons or objects* toward whom the emotion is to be felt, and (3) the sorts of *circumstances* which give rise to it. Attention to his detailed treatment of particular emotions tells us what the real significance of these headings is. Consider his first example, anger, by which he means here *a longing, accompanied by pain, for revenge for unjustified slight against oneself or one's friends* (1378a).[6] The detailed discussion is not an analysis of the emotion, but an account of what the orator needs to know to *produce* it. The state of mind which makes a hearer susceptible to anger is pain at being slighted. The details of the ensuing discussion have to do with the nature of slighting and the kinds of slighting. Agents and circumstances of slighting are characterized. And it is clear that the business of the orator is to induce in hearers the belief (or cognition, we might say) that the circumstances of slighting have occurred and that the persons in question are its agents. So the account tells us in whom anger can be produced, toward whom, and on the basis of what cognitions. Mildness or being appeased (1380a) is introduced as the opposite of anger and is given corresponding treatment. The skilled orator is able to move hearers, through cognition, to an appropriate point along the continuum from anger to appeasement.[7]

All of this so far is, of course, developed within the context of the

Rhetoric, and rhetoric is by Aristotle's definition concerned with identifying the available means of persuasion (1355b); and, of course, its concern is with the effectiveness of means of persuasion rather than with their legitimacy. This is reflected in the focus on the role of specified cognitions as *causes* in producing, increasing, diminishing, or eliminating specified *pathe*. On the other hand (as has been repeatedly observed in the recent literature), despite some tendency to think of emotions as things which "happen" to us, in ordinary life we commonly regard and refer to fear, anger, and other emotions as "justified," "unjustified," "reasonable," "unreasonable," "groundless," and so forth. If those attributions make sense, then it makes sense to look for the reasons or grounds in the same cognitive directions toward which Aristotle points us in Bk.II of the *Rhetoric*. If anger, for example, is ever appropriate at all, then the cognitive aspects of the preceding account, which are meant to provide the materials for an orator who wants to produce it, can be as easily viewed as providing the materials for the *justification* of anger. And it seems quite clear that they are so taken by persons who are angry.

If there are reasonable grounds for anger, fear, pity, or other emotions, then a speaker who confronts hearers with those grounds, thereby producing or modifying the relevant emotions, can be said to be engaged in a kind of logical or rational activity ("rational" in the sense of *reason-giving*). And if we know what constitute reasonable grounds for an emotion, we have at least part of what is needed to evaluate the sort of "argument" whose intended "conclusion" is the relevant kind of emoting. But let us turn now to Aristotle's ethics.

IV

It has sometimes not been sufficiently appreciated by modern readers that it is a mark of the good person, according to Aristotle, not only to *act* appropriately, but also to *feel* or be affected appropriately.[8] Virtue, he says,

> is concerned with passions (*pathe*) and actions, and in these there is excess, defect, and the intermediate. For instance, both fear and confidence and appetite and anger and pity and in general pleasure and pain may be felt both too much and too little, and in both cases not well; but to feel them at the right times, with reference to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive, and in the right way, is what is both intermediate and best, and this is characteristic of virtue. (*EN* 1106b)

It is in varying degrees that certain virtues and other character traits are concerned with emotion. There must be some limits to the scope of our inquiry; and I propose for the remainder of the discussion to give attention mainly to anger, fear, and pity. There may be others as worthy of attention in the present context. But these three have particular prominence in classical rhetoric (and specifically in Aristotle's *Rhetoric*). Also they are three emotions most often mentioned in logicians' complaints

about "appeals to emotion," as reflected in typical treatments of the *ad populum, ad baculum,* and *ad misericordiam.*

For each of the these three emotions there is at least one virtue discussed in *EN* which at least potentially stands in some special relation to it.

(1) *Anger*: The virtue which Aristotle explicitly identifies as having to do with anger ("good temper") comes closest, as characterized by Aristotle, to being a virtue concerned purely with a mean in feeling: "The man who is angry at the right things and with the right people, and, further, as he ought, when he ought, and as long as he ought, is praised" (*EN* 1125b). The point is, of course, not just that anger is allowable under the appropriate circumstances; it appears to be obligatory, or at least it admits of deficiency: "Those who are not angry at the things they should be angry at are thought to be fools, and so are those who are not angry in the right way, at the right time, or with the right persons; for such a man is thought not to feel things nor be pained by them, and, since he does not get angry, he is thought unlikely to defend himself; and to endure being insulted and put up with insult to one's friends is slavish" (1126a).[9] But "good temper" is not the only virtue having intimate connections with anger. *Undeservedness* of the slighting is essential to anger's justification. So *justice* has essential connections with anger for Aristotle, as it does with some other *pathe*, with pity, as we shall see, and indignation, and perhaps also with shame and envy.

(2) *Fear*: Although identified as "a mean with regard to feelings of fear and confidence" (*EN* 1115a), *courage* is to a greater extent than the anger-virtue concerned with *action*; the courageous person is one who not only feels fear and confidence appropriately, but who is willing to confront danger despite appropriate fear, and even to sacrifice life itself for what is fine (1115b). " . . . [T]he brave man both feels and acts according to the merits of the case and in whatever way the rule [*logos*] directs" (1115b).

(3) *Pity*: *Liberality* appears at least at first glance to be about as close as we get to a virtue in *EN* which stands in some significant relation with feelings of pity or compassion; but it is characterized wholly in terms of action: liberality consists in giving "to the right people, the right amounts, and at the right time," etc. (1120a). On the other hand, in discussing *indignation* in the *Rhetoric*, Aristotle says that it is a mark of good character and "is our duty both to feel pity for unmerited distress, and to feel indignation at unmerited prosperity . . . " (1386b). The reason given there is that what is unmerited is unjust. So it may be that for Aristotle it is justice, rather than liberality, which is actually more intimately connected with pity. Justice is not for Aristotle a *mean* with respect to pity, indignation, anger, and their ilk. But it *is* his view that hitting the mean with respect to such *pathe* is characteristic of the just person.

If Aristotle's account is correct, then the emotions have an important

role in the moral life, and their management and habituation are an important aspect of a person's character. Three further observations are in order before we proceed. First, it is not only (or even mainly) *relative to action* that the *pathe* are presented by Aristotle as having their moral significance. It is not just that the person who feels rightly will do rightly, but that feeling rightly is *in itself* an aspect of good character. Second, the "mean" with respect to emotions is, like the mean with respect to actions, a matter of "getting it right," of the "fitting," of "hitting the mark," and so is not reducible to a formula (though we have a "formulation, so to speak, the *orthos logos*). Third, it makes sense to say of some emotion *P* that a person "should feel *P*," even if it is not now in that person's power to feel *P*. Even if it is nonsense to enjoin you to now start undergoing *P* under your own emoting power, still it does make sense to say that you ought now to be undergoing *P*, or that you ought to be the sort of person who would here and now be undergoing *P*. If that makes good sense, then it makes sense (at least) to say that I have grounds for causing you to undergo P (Cf. Kosman, pp. 106-107). I am inclined to go further and say that, since we can work ourselves into emotional states, "You should feel *P*" can have a stronger sense. Remarks by William James, echoed in recent discussions of the ethics of belief, about the sense in which "willing to believe" is possible surely have some bearing on this question. Let us now turn now to the so-called "appeal to emotion".

V

The notion of the "appeal to emotion" as it appears in logic textbooks is ambiguous; or at least it has two quite different aspects which ought to be distinguished.[10] On the one hand, there is the attempt to arouse the emotion (an appeal *toward* emotion, we might say). On the other hand, there is the real appeal *to* the emotion as a basis for action. We might call the former the "*evoking* of emotion," the latter its "*invoking*." Suppose I am the agent of persuasion and you are my patient. I want you to feel *P* in order to get you to do *x*.[11] No doubt my "appeal to emotion" is likely to occur, in a manner of speaking, "all at once." Still, your becoming angry (say) is one thing; your doing x, partly in response to your anger, is another.

It may be that I simply aim to get you to do *x* and have no scruples about how you are gotten to feel or undergo *P*. I may also have no scruples about the appropriateness of *x* as a response by you to undergoing *P*. But this dismal scenario is certainly not the only possibility; in fact, it is certainly not the only actuality. It might be that I really believe propositions of the following sort about you:

(1) You ought to feel *P*.
(2) You ought to do *x*.

Consider a very ordinary case. You are my daughter. An aunt who has

always taken a special interest in your well-being—has treated you with kindness, remembered your special occasions, helped with your educational expenses, and so on—has fallen on hard times and is in ill health and lonely and depressed. I remind you of her many kindnesses and present you with a detailed account of her present difficulties. I say to you after all this, "You really ought to pay Aunt Tillie a visit." I think you should have certain feelings, and that you should act on them. Someone who has been treated as you have been by Aunt Tillie ought to have such feelings. Even if you were not in a position to *do* anything for Aunt Tillie, you still ought to have them. And, if you do have such feelings (here the connection is more tenuous), then (whatever their grounds) you have *prima facie* reason at least for visiting Aunt Tillie.

Does it make sense, though, to speak of emotions as *reasons for action*? Well, as Greenspan points out (1981, pp. 161 ff.), there is at least a minimal sense in which it does: If I have a deathly fear of Fido, even while acknowledging the fear to be ungrounded, I have a prima facie reason at least for avoiding him—he makes a person with my uncontrollable feelings about members of his species uncomfortable, and I do not like to be uncomfortable. But is there a *stronger* sense in which my fear may be a reason for flight? A case can be made, I believe, for saying that there is, or at least for the reasonableness and usefulness of treating emotions as more generally reasons for action; we shall return to this question.

(1) My *evoking* of gratitude or sympathy (or anger, or fear, or of any other emotion) might or might not be "reason-giving." If it is reason-giving, then it treats the emotion (or the proposition that you ought to undergo the emotion) as a conclusion. If you ought to feel grateful for reasons A, B, and C, then my presenting you with A, B, and C is no less appropriate than my presenting you with reasons for doing x when you ought to do x. So much for the question of the *legitimacy* of the appeal to emotion in the *first* sense: it can be a legitimate kind of argument. Of a given attempt to evoke we may ask, "Is it reason-giving? Does it proceed by giving *grounds* (by way of cognition, that is)?" If the answer is "Yes," then we may proceed with an assessment of the particular case. It seems useful, then, to distinguish two kinds of "premises" requiring attention in the *assessment* of particular evokings: *factual* claims and *evaluative* claims (the latter less likely to be explicitly stated by the persuader). Claims of the following sorts will, for instance, serve as "premises" in the kind of case just imagined: (1*a) "Aunt Tillie is in such-and-such circumstances," (1*b) "Aunt Tillie has done so-and-so favors for you," and (2*a) "A person X who has received so-and-so favors from another person Y ought to feel sympathy for Y when Y is found to be undeservedly suffering from such-and-such circumstances." Two questions will then have to be addressed with respect to each of the two kinds of claims: the question of their correctness or *acceptability*, and the question of their bearing on the "conclusion" or *relevance*. I do not mean to suggest that

these notions are unproblematic, just that they are no more so than those required for assessing the giving of reasons for *action*.

The relationship which concerns us in assessing rational evokings of emotion is the relationship between grounds and emotion. An appropriately situated persuader has some business drawing our attention to grounds for pity or anger or fear. But what about cases in which the relevant cognitions are present but are not followed by the appropriate emotions or in which the emotions are disproportionate to the cognitions? Does the rational persuader have any business to conduct in those cases? Well, some of the recent philosophical literature has made the very important point that emotions are as much a function of our level of *attention* to cognitions or thoughts as of the content of the cognitions or thoughts. It is our preoccupation with the thought that the plane might crash or with the possibility that our spouse might be unfaithful which accounts for our unreasonable fear or jealousy.[12] A rhetorical notion which comes to mind in this context is *amplification*.[13] The persuader might call into play rhetorical devices which focus our attention by making certain thoughts or cognitions loom larger for us than others. There is no doubt that something like amplification is an important aspect of the first sort of "appeal to emotion", the evoking. And there is no doubt that it is subject to abuse and sometimes to charges of "manipulation." There is also no doubt that its assessment presents some special difficulties. On the other hand, insofar as it makes sense to speak of more or less reasonable levels of attention, it does seem possible to assess moves made with respect to these matters by a persuader. A preoccupation with the possibility that my spouse will be unfaithful is unreasonable, if the available evidence supports only the remote possibility of her unfaithfulness. A persuader who "amplifies" the probabilities of her continued faithfulness and "depreciates" the possibilities of her betrayal, helping to bring my levels of attention into more reasonable proportion, is, I think, engaged in something at least very much akin to rational argument. Critical assessment of these sorts of persuasive activities may not be easy and may not admit of the kind of exactness we like to extol in introductory logic courses, but it does seem to be possible and, in fact, to be something we already engage in.

(2) So much for the evoking of emotions. I referred to the *invoking* earlier as a matter of appealing *to* the emotion as a basis for action. If evoking is to be thought of in terms of the relationship between grounds and emotion, invoking may be thought of in terms of the relationship between emotion and *action*. In what ways, we might begin by asking, is it that we may go *wrong* with respect to the relationship between emotion and action? There are at least these two possibilities: (1) Action might be *out of proportion* to emotion (if, for example, as emperor, I have you beheaded on account of slight irritation over the way you chew gum); or (2) Action might be too exclusively *in proportion* to emotion—that is, action might be based upon a reading of the situation which takes account

only of how one feels. No doubt there are other possibilities for going wrong here; but it seems that the main issue will again be one of appropriateness or "fit," and that the usual Aristotelian formulation will be applicable: the right thing, at the right time, in the right way. And, at least if we accept the Aristotelian premise, a kind of rational assessment ought to be possible. If so, then moves made by a persuader with respect to invoking emotion ought to in turn be open to rational assessment.

VI

Implicit in the judgment that action may be more or less reasonable as a response to emotion is the conception of emotions as *reasons* (and not just causes) for action. In closing I would like to comment on (a) the notion that emotions may be reasons for action and (b) the conception of *appropriateness*, which I think is important for the assessment of amplification (as a part of evoking) as well as for the assessment of invoking.

(a) We already noticed one sense in which emotion might be a reason for action: if fear is painful, then fear provides at least prima facie grounds for removing oneself from fear-inducing circumstances. But should we regard emotions as reasons for action in some stronger sense? Suppose I have good reason to believe that you have a justified fear of Leo (without myself knowing the details of the justification); does your fear, together with my interest in your well-being, give me a reason for helping you avoid Leo? It seems that in a sense it does. What we might want to say, then, is that *justified* fear is a reason for action. I have deliberately supposed a case in which I, the agent, do not know the reasons for the fear although I do know that there are such reasons. There seem to be three aspects to this situation: the reasons for your fear, the fear itself, and the action, my helping you avoid Leo. In a sense, again, it seems to make sense to say that your fear itself (rather than your reason for being afraid) is the reason for my action. But what about cases in which the fear is my own? Well, we can imagine a case in which I know I had good reasons for fearing x but have forgotten what they were. Even then, though, it could be maintained that those reasons (or even the recollection that I had reasons), rather than my fear, are my reasons for flight.

Independently of the sort of project recommended in the present essay, I must confess, there is no compelling reason for regarding the intermediary (the emotion) as a reason for action. On the other hand, so far as I can see, there is also no compelling reason *not* to so regard it. And, in the context of the kind of assessment suggested earlier for "appeals to emotion," there *are* grounds for regarding emotions as reasons for action. If the distinction between *evoking* and *invoking* of emotion is useful, then it is also useful to speak of emotions as reasons for action, since in our use of that distinction we are concerned to assess separately the relationship between grounds and emotion and the relationship between emotion and responsive action.

(b) *Appropriateness* or "fit" is another conception with respect to which classical rhetorical theory can be of assistance. Aptness of emotional response plays a significant role, as mentioned earlier, in Aristotle's ethics. But "the fitting" (*to prepon*) also plays a significant role in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* (as well as in the *Poetics*), implicitly throughout but explicitly at certain points, for example with respect to the use of emotional language: "To express emotion" he says at 1408a, "you will employ the language of anger in speaking of outrage. . . , the language of exultation for a tale of glory, and that of humiliation for a tale of pity; and so in all other cases." Among ancient authors, perhaps Cicero is most explicit in bringing the rhetorical conception of appropriateness (*decorum*) to bear on ethical theory, more or less identifying it with the Aristotelian "mean."[14] "Such is its essential nature," he writes in *De Officiis* (I, xxvii), "that it is inseparable from moral goodness (*honestas*); for what is proper (decorous) is morally right, and what is morally right is proper." For Cicero's application of the notion of propriety to the moral life, we can examine the ensuing chapters of *De Officiis*; for its connections with rhetorical amplification, we can turn to the later sections of his *Orator*.[15] Our concerns are logical, rather than ethical or rhetorical. But I mention these ethical and rhetorical applications in order to give some indication of the directions in which we might turn for aid in developing a framework for the logical assessment of appropriateness relations between cognitions and emotions and between emotions and responsive actions. The development of such a framework is a large project in and of itself. Such a project is beyond the scope of this paper but would be essential to a full account of the logic of the "appeal to emotion."

There is no doubt a good deal more to be said about these matters. Perhaps enough has been said at least to suggest that standard textbook comments about "appeals to emotion" are much too simple and are the result of superficial thinking about emotion and of inattention to what actually goes on when emotions are evoked and invoked in contexts of persuasion and argument. There are plenty of cases, to be sure, in which emotion is an impediment or diversion; but they are far from the whole story.[16]

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NOTES

1. A good selection of articles is to be found in Rorty's *Explaining Emotions*, from which the essays by Greenspan, Neu, Rorty, Solomon, and Stocker have been particularly helpful in the preparation of the present essay. Other fairly recent accounts which have directly influenced the present discussion are Greenspan (1981), Leighton (1985), Shaffer (1983), and Stocker (1987).

2. Perhaps the "standard" approach is best summed up by a quotation from Isaac Watts' *Logick*: " . . . when an argument is borrowed from any Topics which are suited to engage the Inclinations and Passions of the Hearers on the Side of the Speaker, rather than to convince the judgment, this is *Argumentum ad Passiones*, an Address to the *Passions*: or if it be made publickly,'tis called an *Appeal to the People*"—quoted in C.L. Hamblin (1970).

3. References will be to the Ross translation of the *Nicomachean Ethics of Aristotle* (1925), hereafter *EN*, and to the Roberts translation of the *Rhetoric* (1984).

4. References to Aristotle are, however, common in the recent literature. The present discussion is indebted to the excellent interpretive work (and more) of Fortenbaugh, Kosman, and Leighton (1982).

5. The most obvious reason for thinking the conceptions of these chapters are to be taken more seriously than some other accounts in the *Rhetoric* (for example the accounts of happiness and of the good in Bk.I) is that the orator must know what the *pathe* really are and what their causes really are in order to know how to affect the souls of hearers (while an understanding of how hearers conceive of happiness or goodness, as opposed to a real understanding of the nature of happiness and goodness, is all that is required for rhetorical purposes). See Fortenbaugh (1979) on the use of *esto* ("Let _____ be . . ."), pp. 136-138, and on the seriousness of Aristotle's account, p. 146.

6. That Aristotle brings *slighting*, which we would tend to regard as just one possible cause for anger, into its definition is likely to strike us modern readers as odd. Three comments are worth making about this apparent oddity, however: (1) An examination of actual speeches from the period (for example, the speeches in Thucydides' history of the Peloponnesian War) gives us some sense of the pervasiveness of having been slighted as a ground for anger in the sorts of rhetorical artifacts with which Aristotle was familiar; perhaps in this case Aristotle is couching his definition in terms most appropriate to rhetorical contexts. (2) It is quite likely that Aristotle has Achilles, whose anger certainly fits this definition, in mind as a sort of paradigm case; recall the opening line of the *Iliad*: "Sing, goddess, the anger of Peleus' son Achilleus and its devastation . . . " (Lattimore translation). Now, these two considerations might suggest that the conception of anger here is fundamentally different from our own; on the other hand, (3) careful reading of speeches from the period, of the *Iliad*, and of Aristotle's comments on anger may suggest to some readers that the perception that one has *in some sense* been slighted (maybe even by the gods!) is indeed an essential aspect of being angered.

7. Aristotle's notion that the *pathe* treated in the *Rhetoric* to a significant extent "follow" cognitions is on the whole given support by recent philosophical analysis and argument concerning the emotions. There is considerable disagreement in this recent literature about precisely how the relationship between cognition and emotion ought to be characterized, about whether emotions simply *are* cognitions, about whether the cognitive aspect of emotion ought to be characterized as a matter of holding "beliefs" or making "judgments", about whether all emotions or certain emotions *invariably* involve cognition, and about a host of other details. It has been pointed out by more than one writer that changes in emotion often "lag behind" relevant changes in belief, and it has even been suggested that there is a sort of *akrasia* of the emotions. (See, for example, Greenspan (1981), p. 161; Rorty (1980B), pp. 103ff., and Leighton (1985), pp. 138ff.—among the authors I have cited, Leighton is most unenthusiastic about the "cognitive view" of emotions. What matters for the present account, however, is just that it be agreed that certain common

emotions, most notably those to or for which "appeals" are made in rhetorical situations (fear, anger, and pity, for example), typically have a cognitive element, and that changes in these emotions do *tend* at least to follow or be influenced by appropriate changes in cognition.)

8. Kosman's examination of the "actions and passions" duality and its importance for the Aristotelian conception of virtue is most helpful. "Actions and feelings," he writes, "are thus for Aristotle modes of human being—action and passion—seen in terms of reciprocal concepts basic to our understanding of entities in general, the concepts of acting and being acted upon" (p. 105). Kosman interprets Aristotle (rightly) as regarding a kind of education of the emotions as at the heart of the ethical life. Compare Bertrand Russell's comment in "The Education of the Emotions" (1902), p. 58: " . . .good emotions constitute nearly the whole of the moral life."

9. The notion that the tendency not to feel anger under appropriate circumstances is a *vice* no doubt strikes some late twentieth century readers as objectionable. For our present purposes, however, nothing hinges on the case of anger; all that matters is that there be *some* emotions of which it can be said that "they may be felt too much or too little." Just as there are some kinds of *actions* in which there is no mean and which are never justified, there can be expected to be some kinds of passions in which there is no mean and which are never justified (e.g., envy): "But not every action nor every passion admits of a mean; for some have names that already imply badness, e.g. spite, shamelessness, envy, and in the case of actions adultery, theft, murder . . . Nor does goodness or badness with regard to such things depend on committing adultery with the right woman, at the right time, and in the right way . . . " (*EN* 1107a). If anger happens, contrary to the view of Aristotle and to the sentiments of most ordinary people, to fall into that class of actions and passions which have no mean, this impinges not at all on the general point. There is room for debate about particular emotions in this respect. See, for example, Neu's interesting defense of jealousy in "Jealous Thoughts."

10. The same should probably be said about the rhetorician's notion of *pathetic proof*. The ambiguity is in itself no objection, so long as we understand it. It is useful to have some one term for the sort of persuasive or argumentative use of emotion which both the logician and the rhetorician find worthy of comment. As opposed to either'appeal to emotion' or'pathetic proof', I suggest'*pathotic argument*'. For further discussion of the notion of pathotic argument, see A. Brinton (1988A and 1988B).

11. This is the common sort of case; but it seems quite clear that there can be cases in which I simply want you to feel *P*, without any reference to action, or cases in which your feeling *P* is essentially part of what I want: I will not be satisfied if I think you are doing *x* without really feeling *p*.

The terminology here suggests to modern readers the relation between physician and patient—and this connotation is not inappropriate. After all, one familiar context of emotive persuasion will be the therapeutic situation—See Neu (1977). The therapeutic treatment of the passions is, of course, nothing new to philosophers. It was regarded as the main business of the philosopher by the Stoics and Epicureans; and the therapeutic tradition by no means ends with them. The appropriateness of the term "patient" is, however, more directly a matter of its etymology: the "patient" is the one who is affected, the one who undergoes the *pathe* or "passions".

12. The importance of *attention* to emotion has been appreciated by a number of recent

philosophers, by Greenspan and Rorty, for example, but especially by Michael Stocker (1987).

13. The notion of *amplification* is an important one in classical rhetorical (and literary) theory. Longinus characterizes it as follows, after saying that there are "countless forms of amplification": "To sum it up in general terms, amplification is the accumulation of all the small points and incidental topics bearing on the subject-matter; it adds substance and strength to the argument by dwelling on it . . ." (p. 117). Cicero makes this comment in his *Orator*: "Every part of the speech, to be sure, should be praiseworthy—no word should fall from the orator's lips that is not impressive or precise—but two parts are especially brilliant and effective; the first is the discussion of a general principle, which as I have said above the Greeks call *thesis*, the other consists in exalting or amplifying a theme; their term for this is *auxesis*" (xxxvi, 125). Of *auxesis* and its opposite, Aristotle goes so far as to say in the *Rhetoric* that "Amplification and Depreciation are one kind of enthymeme, viz. the kind used to show that a thing is great or small" (1403a).

14. One recent author who has noticed the significance of the rhetorical conception of appropriateness in understanding the ethical doctrine of the "mean" (though his interest is more in the other direction) is Rosenfield (1965). I am also indebted to Rosenfield for personally drawing my attention to this connection.

15. It should be mentioned that Cicero rejects the Aristotelian notion that there is a mean with respect to anger. At I, xxv of *De Officiis*, he says this (under the influence of the Stoics, no doubt): "This doctrine of the mean is approved by the Peripatetics—and wisely approved, if only they did not speak in praise of anger, and tell us that it is a gift bestowed on us by Nature for a good purpose. But, in reality, anger is in every circumstance to be eradicated . . . "

16. An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the 1987 meetings of the Canadian Society for the History of Rhetoric. I am indebted to colleagues in the Society for their questions and comments.

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